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run counter to our feeling for grammatical regularity, if it is the established usage of the language, it must be allowed. Grammarians cannot make language, but must take it as custom makes it, and Prof. Jespersen realizes this fully. Whether we shall call these changes 'progress' or not is another matter. I shall not quarrel with the term if he will give us the facts, and allow us to draw our own conclusions from them. He must not shut us up to endorsing his philosophy of the matter, but permit us to call it 'retrogression,' if we choose.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

JAMES M. GARNETT.

Lateinische Schulgrammatik von W. DEECKE. Berlin, Calvary, 1893.
Erläuterungen zur Lateinischen Schulgrammatik, by the same.

There is no lack of Latin school-grammars in Germany, and the appearance of a new one is a matter of interest only as indicating new methods of presentation or new ideals in treatment. The present book is more noteworthy than usual by reason of the high standing of its author. Prof. Deecke has long been well known as an important student of Italian dialects, and has contributed not a little to the advancement of that department of Latin philology. As a grammarian in the usual acceptance of the term, he has been prominent only during the last few years; and this is his most important production, his previous work in this line having appeared in programmes, 'berichte' and reviews. His experience as a teacher stretches over a period of forty years, and the present embodiment of that experience takes in many ways the form of a protest against existing methods.

The writer of grammatical text-books now-a-days is confronted by the assertion on the part of many teachers, that no preliminary or school grammar should extend beyond the small size of, say, 200 pages; that a book of larger size is only confusing to the student and should be reserved for more advanced classes. Prof. Deecke works apparently upon this basis, for his grammar contains but 264 pages of large type. But the position is not sound. No parallel can be drawn between a grammar of Greek and Latin, and a preliminary text-book in a scientific subject; for in the latter case the text-book is at the same time the material and the instrument of study, while in the former the material is found in the authors read and the grammar is merely a help. Now, no general grammar of Latin, of only 200 pages, can be sufficient for the systematic study of any one Latin author. Hence in reading, either an edition must be used that supplements the grammar or renders it wholly superfluous, or the peculiarities of the author which give him his individuality and color his style must be unobserved. Such a grammar, while incomplete for the student, is even more so for the teacher, who is perforce driven to other treatises.

The most patent peculiarity of Deecke's grammar is that for which he claims especial credit in the preface—the consistent employment of a German terminology for all linguistic terms except *deponent*, *gerund* and *supine*. Every one will admit that the present grammatical terminology is in many respects defective, and in some cases absolutely meaningless. The temptation to contrive a new and better system is an old one, and one to which many

scholars before Deecke have fallen victims. Even in syntactical constructions some have hoped to solve difficulties by the invention of terms, in most cases satisfactory only to the inventor. Without entering deeply into the Deecke system, it may be sufficient to say that some categories are named for their most characteristic usage, as the cases and the moods, which appear as *Werfall*, *Wesfall*, *Wemfall*, *Wenfall*, *Woherfall*, and *Wirklichkeitsform*, *Möglichkeitsform*, etc. Some names are at the same time definitions, as *Eigenschaftswort* (adjective), *Zeitwort* (verb), *Empfindungswort* (interjection), while others are but translations of the Latin names, both where they are defensible, as *Bindewort* (conjunction), *Zahlwort* (numeral), *Thätigkeitsart* (active), *Leidensart* (passive), and where they rest upon false or metaphysical conceptions, as *Fall* (case), *Fürwort* (pronoun), *Mitwort* (participle), *Vorwort* (preposition), *Biegung* (declension), etc.

It may seem that something is gained in simplicity and directness by such a nomenclature, but this gain is only illusory. Even in the case of the best of these names, those of the cases, we get almost no assistance for that most difficult chapter of Latin grammar—syntax; for the genitive, for example, is the *Wesfall*, to be sure, but the fact that it is above all the complement of the noun has to be explained to the student, whichever name be applied to the case. And the same applies to all the other cases. Of course, no justification whatever can be made for *Biegung* instead of *Deklination*, nor is the translation of the ancients' confession of weakness, *participium*, by *Mitwort* either a gain to the subject or a credit to the translator. A greater objection is that for linguistic students of all nationalities the grammatical terminology is a *lingua franca* inherited from our grammatical forefathers and everywhere current, and the sooner the student becomes familiar with it the better. A German student is learning at the same time French, English, etc., when he learns the time-honored terminology.

There are numerous points of treatment in the grammar of general interest to grammarians, of which a few only may be alluded to. Deecke distinguishes between substantive (*Hauptwort*) and adjective (*Eigenschaftswort*) as subdivisions of the noun (*Nennwort*). There is a regrettable tendency, both in England and in this country, to obscure this thoroughly scientific distinction, and to restrict the term *noun* to the substantive only. Deecke, whose practice it is to mark quantities only when they are certain, gives as the dative case of *hic* and *qui* the forms *huic* and *cui*. This is of course right, though exception may perhaps be taken to Deecke's derivation from *ho-i-i-c* and *quo-i-i*. It may be added that it has been found necessary to introduce *quoniam* into Plautus. Deecke avoids the blunder of giving the genitive of *alius* as *alterius*, though he likewise overlooks the use of *alienus* in this connection. He also insists that the feminine of *quis* the interrogative is not *quae*, which some American grammars strangely maintain. The designation 'supine stem' is retained in spite of its disadvantages, Deecke rightly supposing that it has claims that are not offset by the other designations proposed.

The *Erläuterungen* are almost twice the size of the grammar, and contain valuable but short, and in the syntax very incomplete, compends of the present state of Latin grammar. While they supplement the grammar in affording more detailed information about individual usages, they afford Deecke, at the

same time, an opportunity to summarize the views as to the origin of various forms and usages that he has set forth elsewhere, and to advance some new theories. Reference is made throughout to Greek usage, and in the *Wortlehre* especially the cognate languages are often drawn upon. He is pre-eminently a morphologist rather than a syntactician, and this is painfully evident when we observe that in the *Erläuterungen* the *Wortlehre* covers pages 23-312, the *Satzlehre* 312-444. A general criticism applies to the whole, that in spite of the disclaimer in the preface, the views given are advanced with a positiveness that is hardly warranted in the present diversity of opinion, and very rarely is there any indication that the view advanced is opposed by scholars of authority. A few examples will suffice. In §14 the accentual view (as Deecke understands it) of the Saturnian measure is accepted without remark. In §53 *macte* is regarded only as a vocative of the perfect participle passive. In §64 the *is* of the superlative is a weakened form of the comparative *iōs* (*iōr*). In §68 *quattuor* is a contamination of *quatuor* and *quattor*. In §79 *hic* is compounded thus: *he-i-c*. In §82 *ecquis* is derived from *ec* (= *ēn*) and the indefinite *quis*. In §201 *dum* is from *diu* (= *dies*). In §393 the gerund and gerundive are held to have been originally passive. In §343 the infinitive is considered only as a locative. In §485 *nōn* is given without remark as *ne—unum*. All these questions are matters of dispute among Latinists, and a certain caution should be maintained in statements concerning them.

In §7 we are told that the pronunciation of *nēuter* is *nūter*, as *neutiquam* is pronounced *nūtiquam*; but it is more likely that *neuter* was trisyllabic, and we know that in early Latin *neutiquam* is pronounced *n(e)ūtiquam*. In §34 Deecke protests against Wagener's dictum that *coniunx* is the proper form; but in §46 he uses *coniunx* without question. In §54 we are told that the collective use of the singular is common where the plural, also in common use, denotes rather an enumeration of individual persons or things; but it would have been well to give some historical treatment here, as the statement will not hold for all periods or for all varieties of literature. It might be added here that the lack of information as to historical usage is a serious defect throughout the book. In §91 we have a long and not very clear exposition of the temporal relations in Latin, arranged in a table according to the sphere and the kind of time. He fills out the 'ingressive' kind of time by the inchoative present for the present and the periphrastic for the future, leaving the historical perfect for the past. He deduces the aoristic use of the historical perfect from the ingressive, by a process that is not very convincing. It is well to remember that an ingressive use of any tense is quite possible if the context demands it. The present and the imperfect indicative may be so used in Latin; and the historical perfect is only ingressive in the case of certain verbs whose meaning lends itself to such uses. English poetry shows ingressive aorists in *he slept*, *he wept* and the like, and there is no reason why it should not.¹ It is much more natural to derive the ingressive perfect from the historical than the reverse. The growth of a separate inceptive form was a conscious attempt to fix a category already existent but merged with others in the present system.

¹A good example of the use of the ingressive and historical perfects in English is to be found in the Authorized Version where 'reigned,' of Kings and Chronicles, the equivalent of the Septuagint *ἔβασιλευσε*, is often historical and ingressive in successive sentences.

In the treatment of the syntax Deecke is less at home, and gives occasion for numerous objections. I shall touch upon a few points.

In §223 he says: "to call the predicate noun with *esse* simply the predicate and to designate *esse* itself as a mere copula, is unjustifiable, and renders the logical and grammatical conception more difficult by the unnecessary separation of *esse* from other verbs similarly construed." But *esse* is properly thus separated. It is well known that *esse* is omitted almost at will, and in Tacitus this reaches such a pitch that subjunctive forms of *esse* are likewise suppressed. This is not the case with *manere*, *existere* and the like. No emphasis can be laid upon the fact that *esse* = *dasein*, for this usage of it is infinitesimal compared with its use as a copula. In §226 there are some interesting remarks about apposition. Thus in proper names the *praenomen* is the word defined, the *nomen* is the appositive, and the cognomen a further appositive. It is much more natural, however, to consider the *nomen* as the important word, the *praenomen* as the attributive and the *cognomen* as appositive. But to read into a simple combination like *Scipio Africanus* the meaning *Scipio qui Africani* (or *ab Africa*) *cognomen accepit*, as Deecke would do, seems to be the height of perversity. It is, moreover, quite legitimate, if one desires, to consider *Africanus* as a postponed attribute, though it is better to look upon it as an appositive. In §232 Deecke says that subordinate clauses with *if* are sometimes translated by the Latin dative of the participle: *aestimanti* = *wenn man abschätzt*. In addition to the fact that such translation is wrong, it may be well to remark that the usage is extremely rare and is post-Ciceronian.

In his treatment of the cases Deecke is a 'localist.' The most prominent recent upholder of the 'local' theory has been the late Prof. Whitney. Despite, however, of his potent influence, the 'grammatical' theory has been steadily gaining ground, under the prestige, perhaps, of Delbrück's name. Deecke continues the succession, now that Whitney is dead, and shows no lack of enthusiasm for his view. He is not willing to go to the length of maintaining that the genitive is a 'lokaler Kasus der Herkunft,' and is inclined to regard it as nearly related to the adjective. The dative, however, he assumes to have been originally local of motion *whither*, a function later assumed by the accusative. It is not necessary to open the whole question, but it is interesting to observe that Deecke conceives that the 'final' dative shows a trace of this original local force, *sofern er den Ort oder Gegenstand bezeichnet, an dem eine Handlung zur Ruhe kommt*. Now, the explanation of the origin of the final dative is a difficult one for the upholders of the 'grammatical-case' theory, which assumes that the dative is the case of the remote object, originally a person, later on extended by personification. But they would certainly not admit that a usage that is a mark of later Latin, except with a few verbs—*esse*, *dare*, *ducere*, *habere*, *vertere*—none of which necessarily involve motion, can be accepted as indicating a 'place at which an activity comes to rest.' Such an assumption has no terrors for a 'localist.' Further, Deecke maintains that the accusative of motion *whither* passes over into that of the direct object through the usage of compound verbs; such as *aggredi aliquem* for *gradi ad aliquem*. In this he fails to observe that the usage of the accusative of the direct object must be assumed as original with uncompounded verbs, and that there is no reason whatever to suppose that simple verbs had to wait until compounded

verbs took the accusative before they were permitted to take one. Such an assumption is, however, easy for a 'localist.' In §252 the construction with *refert* is assumed to be originally *mea re fert*, without any indication that to make the construction possible it must have been *e mea re fert*, and that even then the explanation is very doubtful. In §259 Deecke thus speaks of the predicative genitive, in which he lumps together the genitive of quality and *genitivus generis* (a variety of the partitive): "die deutschen Ausdrücke 'ein Mann von Talent, von Ehre' können lateinisch nicht durch den blossen Genitiv wiedergegeben werden, sondern müssen entweder durch *vir ingeniosus*, *probus*, oder durch *vir non parvi ingenii*, *perfectae probitatis* oder dgl. übersetzt werden. Es liegen im Latein Gedankenwendungen zu Grunde, wie: *vir cuius ingenium non parvum*, oder *cuius probitas perfecta est*, so dass das Adjectiv als ursprüngliches Prädikat, auf dem als solchem der eigentliche Nachdruck lag, nicht entbehrt werden kann." This is a good illustration of Deecke's non-illuminating method in dealing with syntactical phenomena. The statement of fact is correct; the explanation is faulty. There is no need to explain why the simple genitive is inadmissible, beyond saying that the modifier of the substantive is an adjective, not a genitive. The adjective is capable of modification only by adverbs of degree. Hence, when the attribute is to be modified in a way other than by comparison, it becomes necessary to change it to a form capable of such modification, i. e. to the substantive. When the substantive can be used so that it *includes the adjective*, it may occur in the genitive alone; but this is modern Litotes and does not appear in Latin before Apuleius, probably. In §316 Deecke claims that the ablative with *plenus*, *refertus* and the like is one of respect, not of means. It is difficult to see why.

Without commenting on the treatment of the moods, which is not very satisfactory, we pass to the infinitive. Deecke holds rigidly to the view that it is originally a locative. No great objection need be made to this even by believers in the theory that it was originally a dative, but Deecke goes to extremes. Here are some examples where "die lokale Grundbedeutung zu erkennen ist": *paro bellare* = *ich rüste mich* (whence the reflexive for *paro*?) *im Kriegsführen*; *studeo excellere* = *ich bemühe mich im Uebertreffen*; *consilium cepi proficisci* = *ich fasste Entschluss inbetreff* (local?) *der Abreise*; *audeo dicere* = *ich bin verwegen im Behaupten* (!!). When local meanings can be recognized in such combinations we are not surprised that it is 'klar' in a sentence like *omnium interest bene beateque vivere*, even if *interest* is of later development than *refert*, which rarely has a complement; or that it even 'schimmert durch' in *urbs obsideri coepta est* = *die Stadt ist (begonnen) im Belagert-werden*. In §367 we find that a sentence like *senatus decrevit captivos non redimere* is incomplete, considered as indicating necessity or design; this is true, but the sentence indicates neither, but merely the will of the senate—a common usage of the negative with the present.

This notice would be incomplete without reference to Deecke's fondness for explanation by subaudition. The following are some instances:—In §222 *senem ante tempus fieri miserum est* (sc. *aliquem*); but *senem fieri* = *senescere* and properly has no subject. In §230, with object clauses *id*, *hoc* or the like may be supplied as subject of a following verb. In §251 the predicate genitive of

possession must have a substantive supplied; *hic ager est (ager) parentis mei*. In *levitatis est secundis rebus superbire* supply *signum, testimonium* or anything that will suit. In §252 genitive of the gerundive to indicate finality is explained by the ellipsis of *causa*. In §253 the construction of *interest* with the possessive pronoun is likewise to be explained by supplying *causa*. In §256 the explanation of the genitive with verbs of reminding, etc., is due to the ellipsis of *memoriam*. In §257 the genitive with judicial verbs is due to the ellipsis of *crimine*. In §259 the predicate genitive of quality labors under the same difficulty as that of possession. In §263 the dative with substantives is due to the ellipsis of a participle. May we look upon Deecke as a Sanctius Redivivus and obliterate the efforts of the last century to expunge ellipsis from the list of syntactical appliances?

While the book is thus disfigured with misleading views and some false statements, the verdict made above may be well repeated, that it is a valuable compendium, though always to be used with caution. It will afford a good introduction to the larger works on Latin grammar and syntax, and contains in itself a large number of keen remarks and a good deal of helpful advice for a teacher who may not know how far to go with a class in initiating the students into the vexed field of historical and theoretical investigation.

GONZALEZ LODGE.

The Ancient Boeotians: their Character and their Culture and their Reputation, by W. RHYS ROBERTS. Cambridge, At the University Press. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895.

An Attic neighbor is an old proverb. The Peloponnesians could be bad neighbors too, as Thukydides (III 105) says, perhaps in allusion to the proverb; but the Attic was undoubtedly a bad neighbor. Boeotia on the north and Megara on the west fared alike ill at his hands, as ill as Connecticut and New Jersey at the hands of the Manhattanese. When Dicaeopolis in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes opens his peace-shop, the first trader from abroad is a Megarian, the second is a Boeotian, and it is hard to tell which is the more contemptuously treated, the Megarian, who is starved out of all human feeling, or the Boeotian, who has been fattened into hopeless stupidity. But whereas no one takes Diedrich Knickerbocker's chapter on the Yankees seriously, most writers on Greek antiquity have passed down the Attic caricatures of Boeotia with scarcely a criticism, and it is only of comparatively late years, and only among scholars of a certain degree of historical imagination, that there has been any decided protest against the diabolical malice of the 'Attikonikoi.'

In his chapter on Hesiod, Bergk, whose vision of things Hellenic was very much widened, as every scholar's must be, by the close study of Greek lyric poetry, has some excellent remarks on Boeotia and the people of Boeotia, and recent writers have modified to some extent the old prejudice that has incorporated itself in the familiar classical phrases which always do duty whenever Boeotia is mentioned, such as 'thick air,' 'land of wethers,' 'Boeotian swine,' and the 'ox-eared dwellers in Oxearshire.' But no one that we can recall has